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1. Introduction 
Many advanced economies have been hit in a particularly harsh way by various crises in the 
past decade. Some of them reacted quite quickly, recuperating their losses in GDP in a short 
time, while some others took longer to exit from recession and stagnation. There is absolutely 
no possible doubt over such statements. Whether such output loss also affected potential 
output growth, instead, is far less clear. 
Therefore, this paper focuses on the hypothesis that severe crises can affect not only output, 
but also potential output of an economy. Trying to answer to this, is a crucial point in modern 
economics, because of its enormous normative implications.  
Eurozone countries are mutually bound by monetary and fiscal policy rules, mainly 
constructed to provide a solid and certain framework for their individual national balance. In 
such a framework, monetary policy is completely supranational. The European Central Bank 
does not depend on single Member State’s positions, but rather of a complex, coordinated 
system for decision making.1 The “tool” with which Member States can steer the economy is 
thus fiscal policy. However, national governments and parliaments have agreed upon a system 
of harmonious rules that limit their own actions, for instance limiting debt stocks and deficit 
financing2. Limitations that can be very strong for Member States in a situation of debt 
overhang or with a high structural deficit. 
It appears quite obvious that, in such a setting of limited sovereignty, the reaction of Euro 
Area Member States to crises is not the same as other countries’, which had the possibility to 
adjust exchange rates and interest rates, as well as their levels of public expenditure and 
taxation. Even more, the ECB itself has no clear mandate for supporting economic growth, 
but its sole objective must be to “maintain price stability” (Art. 127 (1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union). This is a major difference with other Central Banks all 
over the world, as the Federal Reserve in the United States, thought to ensure the highest 
possible independence from governments and political forces.3 
                                                 
1 For the ECB’s complete formal organizational structure and decision making bodies: 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/decisions/govc/html/index.en.html 
2 For rules, procedures, programmes and history of the Stability and Growth Pact: 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-
governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact_en 
3 The Fed’s statutory objectives for monetary policy are maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate 
long-term interest rate:s https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/money_12848.htm 
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This means that Eurozone’s Member States have, in fighting economic downturns, no 
possibility to affect monetary policy nor their currency, which is common to other Member 
States, and a set of relevant limitation on their own fiscal policy. In such a setting, the 
principal controversy among economists has long been whether to grant Member States some 
flexibility in the application of the fiscal policy limitations or to apply a strict constancy to 
them. This dispute has been at the heart of European and national political debate for some 
years, with a confrontation between the so-called “austerity” and “stimulus” defendants.  
The economic literature has been permeated by strongly differing points of view on this issue. 
One of the fundamental aspects of economics affected by these different ways of thinking 
about fiscal policy is the analysis of the crisis’ impact on growth and on potential growth. 
While the first has abundantly been conducted, what is missing from the picture is the second. 
The literature has not sufficiently investigated the effects of crises on potential output levels 
and their growth over time. In other words, not enough attention has been focused on 
hysteresis. Hysteresis is a theoretically well-known concept in economics, a concept borrowed 
from physics and relating to the persistency of an effect on the output at various lags in time. 
Shedding light on hysteresis would greatly improve the above-mentioned dispute, providing a 
more long-term vision when dealing with public finances and the impact of fiscal policy 
especially in times of crisis. This is the declared intent of the paper, which will yield some 
hopefully interesting results with a model on hysteresis, crisis, fiscal restrictions and potential 
output growth. 
The economic environment in the years of interested of this paper is introduced in chapter 2, 
in which there is one paragraph framing the argument on debt and deficit, especially focusing 
on the Euro area; one paragraph on the Italian specific situation; and one paragraph 
introducing the concept of output gap. Chapter 3 goes more in depth on hysteresis, providing 
more elements on potential GDP and its relationship with economic cycles. In chapter 4, the 
complexity of framing a model on hysteresis and its effects on output is explained, together 
with a presentation of the model by Mourougane (2017), which will be the baseline for the 
model proposed by this paper. Chapter 5 will document the results of the proposed model.  
In the end, some important conclusions about data production, availability and timing will 
also be mentioned. They represent the author’s view and should be considered as a central 
part of the paper itself. 
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2. Fifteen years of global turbulence 
The years taken into consideration in this paper are those comprised in the period 2002-2016, 
which has been chosen for several reasons. First of all, it allows to verify the variations which 
have occurred not too far in the past, but still considering a sizeable time framework. 
Secondly, it coincides with the years after the adoption of the Euro as currency by many of 
the countries central to this paper’s focus.4 
Such period covers very different states of the economy, from the post-“Dot-com bubble” 
growth to the worldwide spread of the US subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, from the 
recovery started in 2009 to the Eurozone sovereign bond crisis started in 2011. The analysis is 
particularly focused on Italy and the Eurozone, with a subset of other significant countries 
chosen as benchmarks (Spain, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, US and the aggregate of the 
Euro Area itself).5  
Figure 1: Gross Domestic Product as % change 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IMF’s WEO Database (July 2017) 
                                                 
4 For more information on the history of the adoption of the Euro as currency: https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-
european-union/euro/history-euro/history-euro_en 
5 Data are elaborated from the IMF's World Economic Outlook Database (July 2017)  
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.aspx).  
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As Figure 1 shows, the above-mentioned cyclical episodes developed at different paces at the 
Italian, Eurozone, US and worldwide level. From 2002 to 2016 the United States confirmed 
itself as the main economy in the world. In the same period, the Euro Area enjoyed increases 
but also suffered from losses in its gross domestic product, revealing an economy much more 
sensitive to the shocks that occurred. Comparing the rates of growth in 2017 with those prior 
to the Great Recession, we see at once that neither the US nor the Euro area (not to speak of 
Italy) reached the pre-crisis peak. 
 
Figure 2: Unemployment Rate as % of total labor force (2002-2006) 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IMF’s WEO Database (July 2017) 
In Figure 2, the unemployment rate in 2002-2006, 2007-2011 and 2012-2016 is graphed. At a 
first look, it clearly appears that in the first of the three periods, the seven countries grouped 
all exhibited a rather stable labor market, with dis-homogeneous trends. While Italy, Japan, 
the US and especially Spain's unemployment rate steadily decreased, France and Germany's 
performance was the opposite. 
In 2007-2011, the years in which the economic crisis exploded in the US subprime mortgages 
market and quickly expanded into Europe, it can be seen that unemployment grew in all these 
countries, apart from Germany, which extensively reformed the labor market in the previous 
period. The downturn was particularly harsh in Spain, Greece and Ireland.  
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Figure 3: Unemployment Rate as % of total labor force (2007-2011) 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IMF’s WEO Database (July 2017) 
Figure 4: Unemployment Rate as % of total labor force (2012-2016) 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IMF’s WEO Database (July 2017) 
In the last five years considered, shown in Figure 4, in this subset of economies, the 
unemployment rate stopped increasing. While Italy, France and Germany don't display 
significant trends (a small overall improvement in Germany's labor market, a slight 
improvement in Italy's starting from 2015, a little worsening in France's), the US, the UK 
Spain and Ireland show a very strong path towards reduction in unemployment. Greece, 
instead, does not exhibit a lower unemployment rate, which peaked in 2012, 2013, the worst 
years in its sovereign bond crisis, with the various austerity packages passed by the Greek 
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Parliament. In Europe, the weaker countries still have unemployment rates which are 
significantly higher than the pre-crisis values. 
In short, the distinction in these three five-years periods seems to be characterized by different 
paths in the economies of interest. The following paragraph will provide more details on the 
relationship between GDP, the government debt and the deficit. 
 2.1. Debt and deficit 
Having seen how the panel of economies reacted to cycles in 2002-2016, the following focus 
will be on their debt. As pointed out in Figure 5, the the stock of government debt grew in 
almost all of these countries. Greece, Italy and Japan were the three countries that had a debt 
above 100% of GDP in 2002. The increase of debt for Greece (+73% from 2002 to 2014) and 
Japan (+53% from 2002 to 2014) is astonishing. 
Figure 5: General government gross debt in % of GDP 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IMF’s WEO Database (July 2017) 
However, the Italian government debt also increased (+29%) even if at a less scary pace. But 
also the other countries exhibit a strong growth of debt: France (+59%), Germany (+26%), 
Ireland (+245%), Spain (+96%), the UK (+154%) and the US (+90%). Spain’s was lowering 
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but exploded after 2006; the UK, the US and Ireland boosted their debt after the crisis as well, 
because of the huge State interventions and takeovers of national banking institutions.6 
Of course, evaluating data about government debt immediately raises the issue of debt 
overhang: in some of the above-mentioned countries, the debt stock of a nation may be close 
to the point in which it would exceed its future capacity to repay it. This point cannot be 
precisely estimated because of the many variables that influence sovereign bond markets, in 
particular the government and the State’s credibility, which is almost impossible to proxy. 
Although it is not the purpose of this paper to expand such an issue, it could be important, as 
to correctly infer any conclusion from the previous data on debt, to recall Reinhart and 
Rogoff’s explanation that “GDP growth slows to a snail’s pace once government debt levels 
exceed 90% of GDP”.7 Almost all the countries that have been presented in Figure 5 have a 
debt level higher (in some cases much higher) than 90% of GDP. 
However, rather than on the relationship between debt and growth, this paper focuses on 
fiscal policy’s responses to crises. Being fiscal policy, in the end, the allocation by the public 
sector of its scarce resources, debt levels may be interesting in this setting because they 
influence the cost of borrowing for the State. It is much easier to finance a deficit if cost of 
borrowing is low. This has been a very relevant problem for some of the Euro Area countries 
starting from 2011, when yields on bonds for some of the “peripherical” countries (Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, unfortunately known as “PIIGS”) sky rocketed. Figure 6 
gives an idea of how sizeable the break after 2011 was, by plotting the spread of 10-year 
government bonds of some of the Euro Area countries relative to the yield of the 10-year 
German Bund, usually considered to be the “risk free” benchmark. With cost of borrowing so 
high, no monetary nor exchange rate policy on the table, supranational rules on debt and 
deficit to be respected, these countries had no other alternative than shrinking, even 
considerably, their deficit. 
 
 
                                                 
6 For a complete list of US bailed out banks (updated in 2009): 
http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/bankbailout/ 
7 Reinhart, C.M., Rogoff, K.S., “Growth in a Time of Debt”, NBER Working Paper No. 15639, January 2010, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15639 
As cited by The Economist:  
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576362-seminal-analysis-relationship-between-
debt-and-growth-comes-under 
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Figure 6: 10-years government bonds: yields and spreads relative to that of the German 
Bund for some Euro Area countries (2002-2012) 
 
Source: Giordano, L., Linciano, N., Soccorso, P., The determinants of government yield 
spreads in the euro area, CONSOB, Quaderni di Finanza, October 2012 
In such a critical situation, Parliaments approved austerity measures, to reduce the impact of 
the huge cost of borrowing on their deficit and to restore credibility. As a result, primary 
deficit for many of these countries was reduced (and, on the other hand, primary surplus 
increased), being the primary balance none other than government spending less current 
income from taxes, excluding interest paid on government debt. 
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Figure 7: General government primary net lending/borrowing 
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Source: Author’s elaboration of IMF’s WEO Database (July 2017) 
Figure 7 signals some long-term paths. France and Germany maintain a stable primary 
balance: France with a deficit, Germany mainly in the surplus area. Greece is in a net lending 
position, and a considerable one, until 2013, when it finally reaches the zero value. Ireland, 
after years of primary surplus, falls in 2008 in primary deficit, from which it will only recover 
around 2014-2015. The same holds for Spain, with the exception that Spain still hasn’t 
recovered from the deficit. Italy, notably, is the only country which almost never (only in one 
year, 2009, but close to the zero) is among the primary deficit countries. Unfortunately, as 
will be developed in the following paragraph, the problem for Italy is its huge debt stock, on 
which it has to pay interests. 
Since the aim was to search for years of strong fiscal restriction, the major events in this sense 
can be summarized as follows: for Germany, 2006 and 2011 were years in which its primary 
surplus increased by a sizeable percentage. Greece shrunk its primary deficit steadily and 
importantly from 2010 to 2013, and again in 2016. Similarly, Ireland reduced its deficit from 
2011 to 2016. Italy, in 2012, and Spain, in 2013, exhibit their stronger improvement of their 
primary balances. 
Figure 8: Ranges for the fiscal stance 
Source: Commission Services – Public Finance in EMU – 2016 
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In Figure 8, the lower (upper) bounds indicate full priority to stabilization (sustainability). 
The thick lines indicate restrictive ranges, within which the fiscal stance accommodates both 
stabilization and sustainability needs, while the thin lines  indicate  broad  ranges, within 
which the fiscal stance addresses one objective at the expense of the other. 
As the Italian Ministry of Finance stated in 2017, “given the risk that low investment and high 
unemployment could eventually become structural with long-lasting detrimental effects on 
potential growth, promoting an increase in demand appears to be desirable, in general, 
because of the high efficiency of fiscal policy to attain stabilization goals in such a context. 
Indeed, in the current low interest rate environment, where the European Central Bank 
accommodative monetary policy is maintaining interest rates near the zero floor, an 
expansionary fiscal policy can exert major impact on employment and real GDP as fiscal 
multipliers are proved to be particularly large”.8 Once again, this statement clearly identifies 
the substantial role of the topics of interest of this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, Dipartimento del Tesoro, Relevant Factors Influencing Debt 
Developments in Italy, February 2017 
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2.2. A further detail on Italy 
Having quickly glimpsed at the evolution of a relevant group of advanced economies in 2002-
2016, it seems useful to go more in depth on the Italian situation.  
Figure 9: Log of Gross Domestic Product per Capita, chain-linked values, (1995-2015), 
Italy 
 Source: Author’s elaboration of ISTAT, Conti Economici Nazionali 
 
Italy got into our period of interest, which starts in 2002, after about a decade of stability and 
growth. Following the social and political turmoil which exploded in 1992, the year in which 
the ruling parties crumbled because of the corruption scandal “Tangentopoli” and the war 
with the mafia and organized crime reached its peak in violence, the Italian economy enjoyed 
a quite solid period of growth. This was mainly due to the strong credibility the Maastricht 
Treaty and its ambitious programs in terms of public finance and building of the European 
Union gave to the country. As can be seen in Figure 9, the year 2000 was a change of pace, 
with an increase – yet, still moderate – in the GDP growth rate. Such pace slowed down 2007 
and started declining in 2008, reaching lower levels of GDP per capita, from which the 
country has not recovered ever since. 
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Figure 10: Total Revenue, Primary Balance, Net Borrowing, Italy 
Source: Author’s elaboration of ISTAT, Conti Economici Nazionali 
 
Figure 10 depicts the level of public finances from 2002 to 2015. Until 2007, Italian 
government revenues steadily increased, while the deficit was slightly reduced. The recession 
caused total revenues to fall in 2009, the primary balance to shrink (resulting in a primary 
deficit of € -13.424 mln, the only year among the last two decades of primary deficit) and, 
consequently, the overall deficit to worsen. However, the following years have not been a true 
recovery but rather years of stagnation. In fact, revenues reflect such immobility of the 
economy, with a very limited reduction in the net borrowing from 2013 onwards. 
Therefore, the context in which policy decisions were made was one of a country with 
institutional, political, social and economic processes which are very slow in adapting and 
responding to external factors, particularly the one of the international recovery post-2012. 
The time path of the Italian GDP clearly shows that the losses due to the great recession are 
still far from being compensated by growth and one may wonder whether the crisis left a 
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permanent burden on the Italian potential output and whether the need for a fiscal 
consolidation aggravated this situation. It is in such context that our analysis on the presence 
of hysteresis aims at clarifying if the economic possibilities of the Italian economy have 
permanently worsened after the crisis. 
In other terms, the goal of this paper is to focus on the dynamics of the key economic drivers 
and to try to evaluate how resilient the Italian economy can be said. Following (Hallegatte, 
2014), economic resilience can be said to be <<the ability of the economy to cope, recover, 
and reconstruct and therefore to minimize aggregate consumption losses>> following, for 
instance, a natural disaster or an external shock. 
 
2.3. The output gap 
Potential output is a widely-used concept in economics, being the measurement of the highest 
level of production that an economy can reach without generating inflationary pressures. The 
output gap is the difference between real and potential output. From a methodological point of 
view, the concepts of potential output and output gap enable to separate the real output of an 
economy into a long-term trend (identified with the potential output) and a short or medium 
economic cycle. 
Output gap estimates in economic analysis and fiscal policy are important in order to quantify 
the nature of the economic cycle and to identify the actual economic situation within the 
cycle, as well as to suggest counter-cyclical economic policies aimed at influencing the length 
and the effects of the cycle itself. 
While the objective of using potential output estimates and related concepts is to enable a 
counter-cyclical economic policy (i.e. avoiding further inflationary pressures in boom times 
and support demand in contractionary periods), weaknesses exist, linked to uncertainties 
regarding the measurement of the potential output and of related indicators. 
The potential output is not observable, but instead is estimated on the basis of models and 
assumptions. As pointed out by Ciucci, Zoppè (2017), this means that different models and 
assumptions produce different estimates. Economists evaluate the performance of the applied 
methodologies by looking at revisions of the estimated values over time. The size of output 
gap revisions applied to past years, in particular after the recent economic crises, has 
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generated discussions on the weakness of output gap models and the fragility of the fiscal 
measures based on them. 
Table 1 below presents recent estimates of the output gaps for the Euro area as a whole, as 
published by the European Commission (COM), the IMF and the OECD. It shows that all 
institutions identify an economic performance below its potential for the period 2011-2017.  
 
However, it can be noted that there are rather major differences between the output gap 
estimates of different institutions (and that persist over time) indicating a high degree of 
uncertainty. 
Figure 11 might help realize how the concept of resilience, mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, is central to this discussion. The picture graphs the evolution of the output gap in 
the countries already used as group of interest. A positive output gap, i.e. when real output is 
above potential output, depicts a system producing more than its equilibrium capacity: as a 
result, unemployment decreases and inflation increases. A negative output gap, i.e. when real 
output is below potential output, describes a system producing less than its equilibrium 
capacity: as a result, unemployment increases and inflation decreases (ceteris paribus).  
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Figure 11: Output Gap in % of Potential GDP 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IMF’s WEO Database (July 2017) 
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From Figure 11, it can be seen that Spain, Greece and Ireland had a very similar trend, of 
significantly positive output gaps until 2008-2009, when they became significantly negative 
and very slowly returning towards zero. France and Germany had much smaller variance, 
maintaining a much more stable output gap, apart from Germany in 2003, 2004 and 2005, in 
which its output gap was the most negative among these countries of interest. As for the 
United States, Italy does not exhibit a very large output differential in these 14 years. The 
Italian output gap was quite consistently around zero from 2002 to 2006, positive in 2007-
2008, then dropped to negative in 2009, reached a quasi-zero value in 2011 and then fell back 
into negative area from 2012 onwards.  
This means that, simplifying, it can be said that the Italian economy was very close to its 
equilibrium from the entry in circulation of the Euro until 2006. Then, it was growing more 
(yet, not enormously) than it should have in 2007-2008, collapsing in 2009, after the crisis 
spread out from the United States to Europe. Thus, in 2009 Italy’s production levels were well 
below its equilibrium levels, raising unemployment and bringing about deflation. A couple of 
years after, equilibrium capacity was almost regained, although this did not last long, since in 
2012 the system collapsed again: from then until 2015, Italy never managed to reach the zero-
differential level.  
This paper’s analysis is particularly interested in the first drop in 2009 and the subsequent 
stability in significant negative output gaps from 2012 to 2015. This prolonged period of 
production levels lower than equilibrium, may have distorted the Italian fundamentals in 
various ways: they might have changed the labor market, both in its supply and its demand 
side, they might have reduced participation in the labor force, especially in its least protected 
subgroups (women, over 55, under 30, for instance), they might have changed the education 
and training levels, they might have changed the public and private sector investment levels. 
All of these potential negative changes could be signals of a latent hysteresis effect in the 
Italian economy. This is the reason why the following chapter will focus on this element. 
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 3. Hysteresis  
This chapter will deepen the focus on Italy and the other countries previously mentioned, 
trying to filter economic cycles from potential output analysis. It will briefly explain some of 
the issues undermining estimations, especially as they get closer and closer to real time, and 
raising the issue of classifying our economies of interest with respect to their supposed level 
of resilience. The purpose of this chapter is in fact to define the environment in which the 
effects of fiscal policies of the recent years are studied. 
The previous chapter mentioned hysteresis. Deriving from ancient Greek, the term means “a 
deficiency”, and it is used to define systems, organism and fields that have memory, in the 
acceptation coined by Sir James Alfred Ewing, physicist and engineer (1855-1935). 
According to Webster, it is “a retardation of an effect when the forces acting upon a body are 
changed”, i.e. when the effects of a certain input are experienced with a lagged time, delayed. 
In economics, Blanchard and Summers (1986), although stating that “strictly speaking, the 
word hysteresis should be used only in the case where there is path dependence of steady state 
equilibrium unemployment”, use it more loosely in order to “denote cases where actual 
unemployment affects equilibrium unemployment for a long time”. Hysteresis occurs when 
the economy is altered by a disturbance. For example, as unemployment grows, there may be 
groups of people getting used to lowering their standard of living. Thus, they may internalize 
the lower standard of living, lowering their expectations for the future. This may cause, for 
instance, lower wage bargaining and lower labor market participation. There is a hysteresis 
effect when such social and labor market behavior continues when the economy returns to 
grow. 
Ball (2009) believes that “the natural rate can be influenced by the path of actual 
unemployment. If U rises above U*, for example, there exist mechanisms that pull U* upward. 
Since aggregate demand influences U, hysteresis means that demand also influences U*”.  
There is a broad consensus that deep recessions can have persistent effects on the level of 
potential output. The latter “falls because a recession reduces capital accumulation, leaves 
scars on unemployed whose skills, motivation and attachments to labor markets erode and 
slows technological progress. These long-term effects reflect what is usually called 
“hysteresis”, whereby a transitory shock can have a permanent effect through a memory 
process. As a result, the path of potential output depends not only on current inputs, but also 
on the history of past outputs.” (Mourougane, 2017) 
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Citing Delong, Summers (2012), “Whereas many economists have assumed that the path of 
potential output is invariant to even a deep and prolonged downturn, the available evidence 
raises a strong fear that hysteresis is indeed a factor”. Various elements could be proposed to 
explain why hysteresis arises: there can be human capital factors, like higher school dropout 
rates, lower enrolment at Universities and other tertiary education (in fact, it has been 
observed that from 2007-08 to 2013-14, enrolment in Italian universities has dropped by 13.2 
percentage points, i.e. 40,000 units) or lower skills because of lower labor market 
participation and less training by firms for workers (labor market participation in Italy 
decreased from 62.64% in 2006 to 62.01% in 2010, whereas it increased from 74.99% to 
76.64% in the same period in Germany); there can be structural factors, like a generalized fall 
in private and public investment, or a persistent high youth unemployment level (as it looks to 
be the case, with unemployment in the age range 15-24 soaring from 20.3% in January 2008 
to 28.3% in January 2011 to 43.2% in January 2014 and to 37.1% in January 2017); 
moreover, there can be labor supply effects: people become used to unemployment and may 
remain counted as unemployed, but aren’t really looking for work (or putting downward 
pressure on wages); bargaining effects, i.e. when prolonged unemployment causes members 
to leave unions, and so they aren’t represented in bargaining; labor demand effects, i.e. if 
firms don’t want to hire the long-term unemployed, discouraging the unemployed, so the 
employed worry about losing their job and thus moderate wage demands.  
Indeed, it is very complicated to link these elements in a causal relation. Yet, it seems of great 
interest to develop this topic, to better understand how economies have reacted to the most 
recent periods of crisis. 
However, it must be born in mind that hysteresis may not only have negative effects on the 
potential output: there may also be circumstances in which certain expansive fiscal policies 
can have a positive impact on potential output. This is the case of so-called reverse hysteresis 
and in this paper’s analysis it must not be discarded as nonessential 
 
 3.1. Cycles and potential output 
Having quickly seen what hysteresis is, it seems useful to insert this concept in the framework 
of growth and fiscal policy. First of all, something about potential output estimation must be 
said: as previously pointed out, one of the main problems that arise when considering 
potential output or its derivation, the output gap, is dissimilarity among different estimated 
24 
 
values. Each study uses different methods and uneven models to provide such evaluations, 
thus generating variations which, if very large, may cause estimations to be inconsistent with 
one another. This is an extremely important lesson to bear in mind when discussing results 
that rest on potential output data. And it is especially true as estimations get closer and closer 
in time, i.e. as the margin of error gets larger and larger. Notice that fiscal policy decisions 
reflect the ‘real time’ estimate of the output gap. For a more in-depth assessment of the real-
time reliability of the output gap estimates see (Bundesbank, 2014). 
In addition, another issue regarding estimations is their relationship with the economic cycle. 
In particular, when focusing on short run estimations the economic cycle may divert 
estimations away from the predicted values, changing the sign of the output gap as the 
estimate becomes more accurate. As presented by the previously cited Mourougane (2017) 
and De Long, Summers (2012), such diversion can be significant and substantial, depending 
on how hard the economic shocks hit. 
It is in this framework that this paper tries to develop an argument concerning the interaction 
between hysteresis and fiscal policy, not only by distinguishing the conjuncture from the 
potential output (distinguishing between short and long run effects of fiscal policy; long run 
effects may incorporate hysteresis), but also by providing an idea of which major countries 
can be said to be resilient and which ones cannot. 
The ultimate challenge of this reasoning is to answer the focal questions “which role did 
austerity policies have in slowing and diminishing the post-crisis recovery in Europe? Did 
they entail hysteresis effects on the EU countries? Did they reduce the EU economies’ 
potential output?”. 
 
 3.2. Comparing economic cycles 
Having in mind the concepts and the arguments introduced in the last section, it is interesting 
to compare some other elements of the economic cycle of the past two decades in some of the 
countries already considered. When building a discourse about hysteresis, one of the main 
drivers is the fluctuation of the level of investments. Investments can be by the private sector, 
through families or firms, and by the public sector. Clearly, the presence of hysteresis can be 
hypothesized when the variations in investments get stuck on recent past values, as if the 
economy “memorized” the preceding period and cannot respond in a totally autonomous 
manner. 
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The following Figure 12 covers the evolution of investment, using the concept of gross fixed 
capital formation (GFCF), which is the acquisition (purchases of new or second-hand) and 
creation of assets by producers for their own use, minus disposals of produced fixed assets. 
Data are taken from OECD, Aggregate National Accounts, SNA 2008 (or SNA 1993): Gross 
domestic product. 
 
As can be seen, the annual growth rate of this indicator (i.e. GFCF) exhibits somehow 
common trends among the countries of the sample, with the exception of Greece. In 
particular, from 2003 to 2012 France, Germany and Italy all increase or decrease together, 
although with different paces, especially regarding the widening gap from 2010 
onwards (although in 2015 the path would suggest that the indicator may be reconverging. 
Also the United States roughly followed the same fluctuations, with substantial divergences 
after 2010: from thereafter, the USA’s investment growth rate always remained positive, on 
average about 5% yearly, and with no major variation.  
In this frame of reference, Greece’s path sticks out. In the years 2000, while the other 
countries were relatively homogeneous, Greece enjoyed three years of strong increase in the 
rate of growth in investment (2003, 2006, 2007) and a big fall in 2005. These huge shifts 
(more than three times larger than the other ranges) did not track a consistent, durable trend 
and were most certainly influenced by external factors, such as the Athens Olympic Games in 
2004. Starting from 2008, Greek investment levels will shrink in the following seven years, 
stopping their reduction only in 2015 (-0.2% with respect to 2014), with values around 20 
percentage points in 2010, 2011, 2012. Considering the Greek case as an outlier in this setting 
is interesting also in order to compare it to the country of special focus of this paper, Italy. 
If it is true that in 2010, after the crisis lowered the level of Italian investments (as in all these 
other countries), this investment indicator recovered with values in line with the USA and 
France, it is also true that such recovery did not last long, since the following year and 
especially in 2012 investment shrunk by larger and larger percentages, starting to reduce the 
rate of loss only in 2013. It is precisely in this period that the similarities with Greece, rather 
than the other European countries considered, emerge. In fact, although the order of 
magnitude in investment losses is radically smaller for Italy than for Greece, it appears as in 
2011-2015 these two economies were driven by some relevant common factors that did not 
affect that much the USA, France nore Germany, possibly the evolution of the sovereign debt 
crisis, which strongly linked the two countries.
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Figure 12: Investment Annual Growth Rate 
  
Source: Author’s elaboration of OECD, Aggregate National Accounts, SNA 2008 (or SNA 1993)
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Decomposing investment in its 
three parts, i.e. households, 
firms and public sector, it can 
be seen that Italy had an 
extremely stable partition 
among them. Family 
investment stayed from 2002 to 
2015 roughly around 30%, 
corporate investment above 
50% and government 
investment about 15% of total 
investment. The only 
significant development was in 
2009, when almost 5% of the 
total was substituted from firms 
to the public sector, which 
intervened to cover the 
imbalance. 
This is surprisingly remarkable, 
because it means that, 
notwithstanding the (even 
substantial) variations in total 
investment levels in Italy, its 
three components have 
proceeded in a perfectly 
balanced manner, as stable as 
Germany.  
Once again, the least stable 
subdivision of investment 
components is in the Greek 
economy, although also the 
United States exhibit significant 
(but much smoother than in 
Greece) movements. It will be 
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of great importante to bear in mind these trivial comparisons when considering the results in 
the following chapters. 
   
 
4. A model for hysteresis 
Before presenting the model used as baseline for this paper’s model, it may be useful to 
summarize in a short paragraph the state of the art in the current literature, which has been 
relevantly updated and redefined in the past decade, especially after the Great Recession. 
 
 4.1. State of the art 
There is no general consensus on how to deal with analyzing data, while searching for 
hysteresis effects. Ball (2014) looks at a group of 23 countries, comparing the potential output 
estimates available in that year from the OECD with the IMF’s estimates computed in 2007. 
Losses in potential output range from almost nothing in Australia and Switzerland to more 
than 30% in Greece, Hungary and Ireland. The average loss, weighted by economy size, is 
8.4%. Moreover, “the countries with the largest current losses of potential output also have 
bad prospects going forward. (..) absent sharp accelerations in potential growth, the countries 
damaged most by the Great Recession will do worse and worse over time relative to other 
countries as well as to their own pre-crisis trajectories.” (Ball, 2014) 
 
Howard et al. (2011) calculate that long and severe recessions lead to a permanent loss from 8 
to 10% after 10 years. According to Bordo et al. (2001), instead, by comparing peaks during 
the recession period it can be shown that losses amount to 6.2% of GDP for banking crises, 
18.6% for twin crises (exchange rate and banking crises).  
 
Bordo, Meissner and Stuckler (2009) construct an ECM model with data from 18 countries 
between 1880 and 1913 and 45 countries between 1973 GDP per capita. They conclude that 
crises are followed by an output loss of about 1.5% in the long term for the most recent period 
and of 4% for the first wave of globalization. As for Haltmaier (2012), growth rate decreases 
on average by 0.5% two years after the peak, while half of this loss is recovered in the years 
that followed. The cumulated loss is estimated to 1.5 percentage points 4 years after the peak. 
This loss is bigger for developed countries than for emerging-market economies. 
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Hall (2014) focuses on the United States, by using a counterfactual: the post-crisis shortfall is 
the difference between the 1990-2007 trend and actual data. From the end of 2007 to 2013, 
American output fell by a cumulative 13.3% below pre-crisis trend, with most of the shortfall 
occurring before the end of 2010. By looking at OECD countries, Haugh et al. (2009) argue 
that Japan is the only country for which a banking crisis would have a persistent impact on 
potential growth. 
 
Barro (2001) estimated a dummy variable model in a panel of 67 developed and developing 
Economies, with data on 1965-2000 GDP per capita. His point is that twin crises lead to a 
reduction by 2 percentage points in GDP per capita over a five-year period (1.3 point for an 
exchange rate crisis and 0.6 for a banking crisis) and that there is no effect after 5 years. 
Finally, for Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), analyzing both OECD countries and a few emerging 
market economies, Banking crises are followed by a recession that lasts on average 2 years 
and leads to a cumulated loss of GDP per capita. Production would decline from peak to 
through on average by 9%. 
 
 4.2. A complex analysis  
As outlined in the previous chapters, there are various issues undermining any identification, 
valuation and calculation strategy when considering potential output and the possible presence 
of hysteresis effects in the Eurozone. 
 
The following Chart 1 and Chart 2 depict the higher uncertainty brought about by the crisis, 
with a remarkable growth in the margin of error, in volatility and ranges of potential output 
estimates. “Misjudging the size of the output gap can lead to significant policy mistakes. The 
perception of having more spare capacity than is actually available in the economy can lead to 
a more accommodative monetary or economic policy than needed, fuelling inflation and 
potential bubbles. In fact, in 2007, prior to the crisis, all euro area countries were perceived to 
have significantly less favourable output gaps than their ex post assessments have shown”. 
(Anderton et al., 2014)
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Jarocinsky and Lenza 
(2016), moreover, remind 
that it is “important to 
discriminate among 
modelling assumptions. In 
fact, while the alternative 
estimates agree about the 
timing of peaks and 
troughs, they disagree about 
the level of the output gap. 
Such differences are 
economically relevant: the 
output gap in 2014 and 
2015 was, on average, close 
to -2% according to some 
estimates, and -6% according to others”, as can be seen in Chart 1. 
Therefore, this paper will try to develop a very simple econometric model to analyze the 
relationship among potential output and the periods of crisis in the Euro area from 2007/2008 and 
from 2011/2012. 
Many commentators and a substantial portion of the European countries’ political leaders state that 
the Eurozone’s potential output was permanently reduced after 2008, but what is less certain is the 
long-term impact on the growth rate of potential output (see e.g. European Commission, 2009; 
ECB, 2009; and ECB, 2011). Potential output has likely been limited by a reduction in capital 
reserves, caused by capital scrapping, i.e. when assets are withdrawn from the capital stock at the 
end of their service lives. This type of reconstruction seems reasonable, as many sectors were 
particularly hit by the financial and economic crisis, which persistently downsized their industries. 
Also, structural unemployment could have rose. Data are unambiguous: in the Eurozone, 
unemployment has increased since the crisis hit Europe; what is instead still surrounded by 
ambiguity is the longer term effect on potential growth. Indeed, it has been argued that while, in 
general, recessions tend to have only a temporary effect on potential growth, i.e. are limited to a 
one-time shift in the level of potential output, a prolonged recession may have hysteresis-type 
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effects that are longer-lasting, especially when recessions are associated with financial crises 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
However, in this paper we follow Annabelle Mourougane’s view, according to whom hysteresis 
effects are so hard to quantify that in 2014, i.e. six years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
output is still depressed in many countries, suggesting that the extent of hysteresis and/or its impact 
on the economy may have been underestimated. One reason may be that most empirical models 
which estimate the effects of financial crises do not explicitly account for hysteresis. When the 
latter is incorporated in the analysis it is in an ad hoc and partial way, most of the time through an 
autoregressive process. This simplifying assumption stems from the difficulty of quantifying the 
degree of hysteresis. First, it is difficult to disentangle the effects coming from hysteresis from those 
reflecting trend changes due to a technological or a population shock. Second, stabilization policies 
are likely to affect hysteresis (Mourougane, 2017). 
 
4.3. The model in Mourougane, 2017 
The baseline model of Mourougane seeks to estimate the impact of crises on potential output by 
regressing the latter on a dummy capturing the beginning of a crisis period. The effect of any crisis 
is independent of the lags of potential output (otherwise, the model would be sensitive to the choice 
of the number of lags, and as a result would tend to be unstable) because lagged changes in labor 
force participation enter only as control variables and are not used to derive the impulse response 
functions, and because the structure of the equation does not impose permanent effects. 
More specifically, the dynamics of potential output is given by: 
   
   (1) 
 
Where 
 yt
* is the log of potential output, with l the number of lags in the process 
 Di,t is a dummy which is equal to 1 at the start of a financial crisis 
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 αi,k is a country fixed effect 
 the parameter δk gives the impact at period k. 
This specification was amended in two ways, in order to improve it. Firstly, to test if crisis impact 
potential growth levels, the model allowed for possible changes in the constant, when potential and 
actual growth differ for more than 1 point, i.e. when supply can be altered by the fall in demand. 
For significant ruptures, crisis will affect potential output, hence a future lower potential growth 
could be experienced. 
             
(2) 
 
Where Ci,t equals n for n banking crises before year t. 
Even further, hysteresis was included in (2) following Kapadia (2005), according to whom a 
deviation of actual growth from potential growth leads to a permanent change in potential growth: 
 
(3) 
 
Where  
yt is the actual output log 
µ is the hysteresis level (µ>0) 
u is a productivity shock of zero mean and variance σa 
ρa is the productivity shock’s past impact 
The combination of (2) and (3) gives ∀k = 1…T 
 
(4) 
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Where δk + θk is the impact of the crisis, µj,k the hysteresis effect and l is the length of the memory 
process. It must also be noted that  
 
 
 
 
 
 
With OGi,t-j being the output gap at time t-j. Hence, in (4) potential output growth is a function of, 
among the others, output gap growth. 
The specification in (4), however, has a major disadvantage: hysteresis is modelled as a linear 
process, but it could be nonlinear. This must be kept in mind when analyzing the results. 
 
 4.4. The adapted model 
The focus of this paper is on hysteresis in relation to effects of fiscal policy. The above-detailed 
model will be readjusted to a slightly different framework. In particular, the initial specification will 
be: 
 
(5) 
 
 
Where           is the log of potential output, with 1 the number of lags in the process 
          is a dummy, equal to 1 in a year of fiscal restriction 
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  is a country fixed effect 
introducing FRi,t as the new dummy, not linked to the start of a financial crisis, but instead to the 
presence of fiscal restriction in that very same year. However, whether such dummy is independent 
of the error term is questionable: FRi,t and εi,t+k may be correlated. For instance, in a system 
providing specific thresholds to sovereign States in managing their budgets, such as the Stability 
and Growth Pact in the European Union, the presence of an economic shock would pose the 
problem of endogeneity. In the event of an exogenous economic downturn, government expenditure 
increases through automatic stabilizers and government revenues drop. Due to such supranational 
rules, the deficit must be maintained relatively unchanged, so it is very likely that governments need 
to enact restrictive fiscal policies to keep the system balanced. 
Following this reasoning, to overcome such dependence mechanism, equation (5) must take into 
account the presence of financial crises in a strategy similar to that adopted by Mourougane and 
described in the previous section, which reasonably holds: inserting a variable Ci,t, which equals 1 if 
there was a crisis in year t-1, the previous year, and captures previous crises.  
 
 
            
 (6) 
 
 
Ci,t, is constructed following the approach by Laeven and Valencia (2012), in identifying all 
systemic banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises. 
Furthermore, it is crucial to provide a definition of fiscal restriction, as meant when referring to the 
dummy variable FRi,t in the model. Fiscal restriction is intended to be the increase in the cyclically-
adjusted primary surplus by at least 1.5% of GDP on an annual basis (following Alesina, 2009).  
This approach of considering only major differentials in deficit management is another response to 
the previously outlined matter of endogeneity: fiscal policy clearly depends on economic and 
financial situations. A critical assumption is that “at least up to a point the decision of whether or 
not to act on the spending side or the revenue side of the government is dictated by political 
preferences and political bargain which is, at least to a point, exogenous to the economy and 
generated by ideological or policy preferences. Looking at the debates proceeding major fiscal 
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changes, and considering the high degree of uncertainty about the size of fiscal multipliers this 
assumption holds some water.” (Alesina, 2009) 
 
 4.5. Crisis effects across countries and over time 
Equation (6) presents some other issues to be dealt with. It would assume that hysteresis effects do 
not vary to a great extent from country to country, but in reality, it is evident that the resilience of 
the labor markets depend on country-specific structural differences. These are certainly accounted 
for by country fixed effects, but country fixed effects capture many other differences that are not 
specified in the notation, such as the quality of institutions, the legal system, etc. In an ideal setting, 
the best solution would be to estimate country-specific hysteresis coefficients, but in this case the 
little degree of freedom (due to data availability) does not allow to proceed in such way. The 
alternative path chosen by Mourougane (2017) is to introduce an interaction term through which the 
crisis impact will also depend on the extent of hysteresis experienced by individual countries.  
 
 
 
 
(7) 
 
 
Where the crisis effect on potential growth is in part independent on the country (δk) and in part 
country-specific ρk,j ( Δyi,t-j - Δ*yi,t-j ). Furthermore, the proposed estimation relies only on one lag ( l 
= 1 ) and provides only one prediction ( k = 1 ) due to the scarceness of data. The main drawback to 
such a major simplification is the impossibility to comment the impact of the variables over a longer 
time span, i.e. k = 2, 3, ... T.  
However, as will be seen in the following paragraph, the available framework still allows to 
conclude on some significant results. 
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 5. Results  
Regressing equation (7) leads to various interesting results. As can be seen in the summary statistic 
in Annex A, the R2 is not so large (32%), indicating quite highly volatile, noisy data. However, even 
highly volatile, noisy can have a significant trend. This is the case: θk, βj,k, µj,k are all significant at 
the 95% confidence level and δk is significant at the 90% level, while ρk,j is definitely not 
significant. 
This means that, with 95% confidence, having had a major systemic banking, currency, sovereign 
debt crisis (Ci,t = 1) does have a significant impact on potential output growth. Similarly, potential 
output growth is significantly dependent on its first lag. Also, potential growth is significantly 
correlated with the growth in the previous year of the output gap. FRi,t, i.e. a year of strong (at least 
1.5% of GDP) fiscal restriction, instead is significant only at the lower 90% confidence interval. 
Looking more in detail into the variation of potential GDP growth over time, some important 
conclusions can be drawn. First of all, by considering the group of countries in the dataset as a 
whole. This way, in the period 2003-2017 presented in Figure 13, it can be seen that data are very 
compact and variability is limited. There is only one remarkable outlier, i.e. Ireland in 2015, when 
the country’s GDP grew by a remarkable 26.3% with respect to 2014, due to the inclusion in the 
country’s corporate private sector of a set of foreign companies that switched their base to Ireland.9 
Obviously, such a momentous rate of growth in output, also affected the rate of growth of potential 
output. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 For more details about Ireland’s 26% GDP growth rate in 2015: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/12/irish-economic-growth-revised-figures-foreign-investment-
aircraft 
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Figure 13: Potential output growth in the dataset countries (2003-2017) 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IMF’s WEO Database (July 2017) 
Another outcome that is easily visible in Figure 12 is that in this period potential GDP mostly 
increased. Even in the harsher years of the Great Recession and of the Eurozone sovereign bond 
crisis, most countries had a positive variation in potential output. Whether this is feasible and 
logical, it is a matter of evaluation, since, it is noteworthy to repeat, potential GDP and the output 
gap are estimates, not hard data.  
Abandoning a yearly-based analysis and adopting a country-based one for the very same data, 
allows to infer some other interesting facts. The picture is provided by Figures 14 and 15 and 
permits to compare in the various histograms, in one case the growth of potential output, and in the 
other case the output gap growth, between countries. 
The largest variations in potential output growth can be seen for Greece, Ireland and Spain, with 
Italy and Portugal very close to zero, and Greece even negative. On the other hand, Australia seems 
to have the most compact (and among the highest) data for potential GDP growth.
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Figure 14: Potential Output Growth Rates per Country (2003-2017) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IMF’s WEO Database (July 2017) 
 
Figure 15: Output Gap Growth Rates per Country (2002-2016) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IMF’s WEO Database (July 2017)  
Evidently, output gap growth is most variable for Greece and Ireland. Once again, it is Australia 
that sees the least variation in variability. 
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If Going back to the regression of equation (7), a graphical interpretation of the impact of µj,k is 
provided by Figure 16.  
Figure 16: Potential GDP growth vs. Output gap growth (2003-2017) 
Source: Author’s elaboration of IMF’s WEO Database (July 2017) 
The figure plots the level of output gap growth on the x-axis versus the level of potential output 
growth on the y-axis. As highlighted by the blue fitted line, there is a positive correlation, which the 
regression output shows to be significant, among the two variables. The slope of the fitted line is 
positive and smaller than 1. Since values are quite small, they are all concentrated around the origin; 
however, the above-mentioned outlier given by Ireland is present and evident also in this plot as the 
most unpredictable value. 
In short, it seems reasonable to state that, since both the descriptive statistic deriving from the 
observation of the plot in Figure 16 and the results cited in Annex A denote a correlation, the 
hysteresis effect µj,k is a significant, positive coefficient in equation (7).  
Hysteresis, as modeled in this framework, thus has a significant, positive impact on the rate of 
growth of potential output. In other words, an increase in the output gap will impact positively the 
potential GDP growth rate one year from now. Holding the assumption that endogeneity, as 
expressed in previous chapters, does not affect the causal relationship at the basis of equation (7). 
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Such results should be considered with caution, together with the setting the model was built in and 
with all the previously explained limits of estimates and datasets used. Still, they provide a tentative 
model with a series of interesting implications, in a yet-to-be-developed field of economics. 
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 6. Conclusions 
The perspective of this paper is to try offer a tentative contribution to the studies on the effects of 
strong crises on potential growth. It is a crucial topic for today’s economics, since all major political 
decisions on fiscal policy depend on the answer that could be given to such an issue. The starting 
point has been the model developed and used by Annabelle Mourougane in 2017 through which she 
confronted hysteresis and its effects on potential output growth. The model has been slightly 
redefined with the use of a different dummy variable and of a different dataset. The dummy variable 
introduced is whether the country experiences a fiscal consolidation of at least 1.5% of GDP, as 
defined by Alesina and Ardagna in 2009. The dataset is a group of 20 developed countries – 11 in 
the Eurozone and 9 with non-Euro currencies – with data taken from the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook Database, as updated in July 2017. 
What can be said, keeping in mind the limitations due to the lack of thorough, completely credible 
data, their short time span, their availability only in annual form, is that strong crises impact the 
growth of potential output. Also, hysteresis is present and part of the impact in a significant way. 
Because of the above-mentioned concerns regarding data, a relevant assumption has been made: 
Mourougane’s model and this paper’s setting would allow for various lags for growth in potential 
output.   
A very important part of the argument in favor of strong fiscal consolidation, even in times of 
economic downturn, not only in response to automatic stabilizers, but also for reputational and 
credibility purposes in presence of highly indebted sovereign countries, is that crises do not impact 
potential output. Crises would reduce output, which would shortly recuperate and readjust itself to 
potential output levels. However, it has been suggested that this is not the case and that, even in a 
very reduced time frame, also potential output growth is significantly affected. Clearly, it would be 
important to further assess the way through which this happens. 
A second noteworthy conclusion is that, in order to have a better understanding of these 
relationships, data collection and availability should be enhanced. Output gaps and potential output 
are estimates. This however does not mean they should not be improved. Provision of semestral or 
trimestral data, in addition to annual ones, would be very helpful in order to restrict timing and 
having a clearer picture of responses to crises or harsh fiscal restrictions. There is no general 
consensus on how to deal with analyzing data, searching for hysteresis effects. However, it seems 
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more than reasonable to deepen the knowledge on the topic. The effects can be overwhelmingly 
relevant for fiscal policy decision makers. 
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 Annex A 
Summary Statistic of the regression model from equation (7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of obs  =     300 
F(  5,   294)  =   27.37 
Prob > F       =  0.0000 
R-squared      =  0.3176 
Adj R-squared  =  0.3060 
Root MSE       =  0.0136 
 
 
      Source |       SS       df        MS  
-------------+------------------------------ 
       Model |  0.02533235     5  0.00506647 
    Residual |  0.05442669   294  0.00018513 
-------------+------------------------------ 
       Total |  0.07975904   299   
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
   potgrowth |     Coef.    Std. Err.     t     P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]  
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      crisis |   -.006112    .002470    -2.48   0.014     -.010980    -.001256 
    potgrlag |   .4670662    .050128     9.32   0.000     .3684113    .5657209 
      outgap |   .0804227    .038779     2.07   0.039     .0041037    .1567417 
    outgapfr |   .0560331   .0949027     0.59   0.555     -.130742    .2428079 
          fr |   -.003738   .0021576    -1.73   0.084     -.007985    .0005084 
       _cons |   .0087719   .0012493     7.02   0.000     .0063132    .0112307 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
